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Resumen
Este artículo reporta condiciones de primer orden para una clase muy general de subastas unitarias o multi-
unidades. Bajo condiciones débiles caracterizamos el comportamiento óptimo de los agentes y generalizamos
resultados estándar en la literatura. Como una aplicación obtenemos condiciones suﬁcientes para revelación de
la verdad, estrategias óptimas monótonas y algunos resultados de identiﬁcación para subastas multi-unidades.
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Abstract
This paper provides ﬁrst order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions.
Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the
literature. As an application we obtain suﬃcient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic best reply
strategies and identiﬁcation results for multi-unit auctions.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C62, C72, D44, D82.
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1 Introduction
Many experimental and empirical work suggest that the participants of auctions do (or at least may) not
follow their equilibrium strategies.1 Although there is a considerable debate about this point, it highlights the
assumption that equilibrium behavior might be too strong. An alternative approach is to assume only that
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1For a survey of experimental works, see Kagel (1995) and for the empirical literature on auction data, see Laﬀont (1997).
1the players follow rationalizable strategies, instead of equilibrium strategies. Pursuing this idea, Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003) show that some empirical and experimental ﬁndings can be explained. Nevertheless,
they still assume what Harsanyi (1967-8) calls consistency of beliefs, that is, the subjective probability that
players attribute to the distribution of signals of the opponents is just a conditional distribution and the
conditional distribution of all players comes from the same prior distribution.2 This is almost always assumed
in game theory and one may think that nothing can be said without this basic assumption. To the contrary,
we show that if we adhere to the even weaker assumption that bidders are rational, we can still characterize
their strategic behavior.
Our model encompasses a very general class of seal-bid auction models. We allow for interdependent
values, asymmetric valuations, any attitude towards risk, non-monotonic valuations, non-separable transfers,
dependent signals of any dimension (universal type spaces), unitary or multiple unit demands auctions with
just sellers or buyers or both. Under general conditions we prove what we call the basic principle of bidding.
This formalizes in a general setup an intuition that auction theorists already have. That is “a rational bidder
bids in order to equalize the marginal beneﬁt of bidding (the utility that she obtains in case of winning) to
the marginal cost of bidding”.
In one sense, it is obvious that in smooth optimization problems, at the optimum the marginal beneﬁt
(derivative of the objective function) equals to the marginal cost (shadow price) of the constraints. Never-
theless, this is not exactly the case for auctions, where the marginal cost does not come from a constraint.
This is also diﬀerent from the classic ﬁrm’s problem: marginal revenue equals to marginal cost, because
we do not need to assume separability of revenues and costs. In auctions, the marginal costs and beneﬁts
come from another source. The basic trade-oﬀ that a bidder faces is that a higher bid, although it increases
the probability of winning, it may also decreases the payoﬀ in case of winning. Using the Leibiniz rule, to
diﬀerentiate an integral that depends on the variable both in the region of integration and in the integrand,
we obtain two terms. These two terms can be interpreted as marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost.
Although the prove is reminiscent of Leibiniz rule in diﬀerential calculus, we rely on the diﬀerential theory
of measures. When we introduce additional assumptions, i.e., continuously diﬀerentiability of payoﬀs with
respect to bids, we provide ﬁrst order conditions that generalize those obtained by Milgrom and Weber (1982)
for ﬁrst- and second-price auctions, Krishna and Morgan (1997) for the all-pay auction and war of attrition,
and Williams (1991) for buyers’-bids double auctions. When one introduces the additional hypotheses of
risk neutrality, symmetry and monotonicity of the utility function, the characterization provided reduces to
2This is also called common prior assumption.
2the ones on those papers. In addition, we provide ﬁrst order conditions for the multi-unit discriminatory,
uniform and Vickrey auction.
The payoﬀ characterization lemma, which is the main result of this paper, and which is valid in the most
general setting, interdependent values, asymmetric valuations, any attitude towards risk, non-monotonic
valuations or separability of transfers, dependent signals of any dimension and unitary or multiple unit
demands, opens the way to a general approach to equilibrium existence for general auction models like in
Araujo and De Castro (2005). It can also provide insights for empirical and experimental studies, since every
bid (even the initial or the apparently inconsistent ones in a repeated game) bears valuable information about
the players’ beliefs and the ﬁrst order conditions is a ﬁrst step towards characterizing rational behavior in
general auctions. Also, as the recent literature on econometric identiﬁcation of auction models has pointed
out, characterizing best reply bidding strategies allows for identiﬁcation in many standard auction formats.3
Along this approach, our result provides ground for general econometric identiﬁcation of multidimensional
auction models. We present some of these results in subsection 4.3. We also use our results to give a simple
characterization of truth-telling in multi-unit auctions. After our results, the proof that Vickrey auction is
truth-telling is immediate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and notation. Section 3 contains the
main results and some examples of direct applications. Section 4 uses the results to obtain a proof of the
truth-telling property of Vicrkey auctions. We also prove a monotonic-best reply result that generalizes
for multiunits auctions a result of Araujo and de Castro (2007), which is the key result for their proof of
equilibrium existence in single-object auctions. In this section we also report results on inidentiﬁcation in
multiunit auctions, some of which are new, to the best of our knowledge. Section 5 is the appendix, contains
some proofs.
2 The Model
2.1 Players and Information
There are N strategic players.4 we denote by N = {1,...N} the set of strategic players. Player i ∈ N
receives a signal (i.e., private information), ti ∈ Ti where Ti is the information set of player i. We denote
by t=(t1,t2,...,tN) = (ti,t−i) the vector of all players’ information, where t−i = (t1,...,ti−1,ti+1,...,tN), as
3See Athey and Haile (2005) for a survey on the main issues regarding the econometric identiﬁcation of auction models.
4Our model is inspired in auction games, although it can encompass a general class of discontinuous games. For convenience
and easy understanding, we will use the terminology of auction theory, such as “bidding functions” and “bids” for strategies
and actions, respectively.
3usual. Let =i be a σ-ﬁeld of subsets of Ti and deﬁne T ≡
N Y
i=1




We assume that there is a probability space (T,=,τ). Deﬁne the probability spaces, (Ti,=i,τi), where each
τi is the marginal probability of τ (i.e., τi (A) = τ {t ∈ T : ti ∈ A}). For notational simplicity we assume
that τ is the same for every agent but, nothing that follows depends on that. That is, our results do not
require the common prior assumption. If g is a function of t−i, we denote the expectation of g with respect
to τ−i, given ti, by E [g|ti].
Notice that individual signals may be dependent and of arbitrary dimension. We allow for the existence
of an uninformed and non-strategic player, named 0. This is the seller in traditional auctions. For double
auctions, there is no such player. We denote by N0 = {0,1,...N} the set of all players (strategic and non-
strategic). Also, N0−i denotes the set of strategic and non-strategic players except for agent i, and similarly
for N−i.
2.2 Objects and Bidding
There are K identical indivisible objects. Each player i ∈ N0 comes to the auction with ei ∈ {0,1,2,...}
units of the same object, and
PN
i=0 ei = K. After receiving its signal, a strategic player submits a sealed
proposal, that is, a bid (or oﬀer) that is a vector of real numbers, bi ∈ B ⊆ RK where B denotes the set of
valid bids, that is, B = {b ∈ RK : bk ≥ bk+1 for k = 1,...K} ∩ [b,b], bi,k is the maximum value that bidder i
is willing to pay for the k’th unit, given that he is receiving k − 1 units; and [b,b] denotes a K dimensional
rectangle that bounds the set of all bids. Since bids are non-increasing we are implicitly assuming that there
are no complementarity among objects. Bids are in units of account (i.e., dollars). The non-strategic player
0 also places a bid b0 ∈ B, meaning that there is a reserve price for each unit.5 For instance, in a one-object
auction (K = 1) where all players are buyers, if maxj=1,...,N bj,1 < b0,1, this means that none of the bidders
are willing to pay the reserve price. The diﬀerence is that b0 is known for everyone at the time the auction
takes place, while bj, j 6= 0, is not known for bidder i 6= j, i ∈ N0.6 We denote by b the vector of all players’
bids, b ∈ R(N+1)K.
5If the model does not specify a reserve price it is usual to assume bmin = 0.
6Unknown reserve prices can be modeled as the bid of a strategic bidder.
42.3 Allocation and Payoﬀs
The “auction house” computes the bids and determines how many units each player receives. If player i
wins a k’th unit, his payoﬀ is increased by ui,k (t,b), where ui,k : T × R(N+1)K → R.7 Thus, if player i ∈ N
ends the auction with exactly mi ∈ {0,1,...,K} units, his payoﬀ is
Pmi
k=0 ui,k (t,b).8 In the examples we
shall restrict to separable transfers so, for later reference, for each player i and unit k, let vi,k : T → R be a
function such that vi,k(t) represents the (marginal) value, in units of account, of the k’th unit for player i
when the vector of signals is t ∈ T.
If mi < ei, the player has sold ei −mi units in the auction and if mi > ei, the player has bought mi −ei
units in the auction. No negotiation was made if mi = ei.
Given b−i, let si = (si,1,si,2,...,si,K), with si,1 ≤ si,2 ≤ ... ≤ si,K, denote the (inverse) residual supply
curve facing bidder i. That is, si,K is the highest of the bids by players j 6= i, si,K−1 is the second highest
and so on. Thus, for getting (for sure) at least one unit, bidder i’s highest bid must be above si,1, that is,
















Figure 1: Bid ( bi) and supply (si) curves for bidder i. In the
situation displayed, bidder i receives three units, because bi,3 > si,3
but bi,4 < si,4.
In order to decide who wins an object, we will assume that the auction house uses an allocation (or
tie-breaking) rule.
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation rule is any function a : R(N+1)K → [0,1]
(N+1)K such that:
7We consider the dependence on b instead of bi because we want to include in our results auctions where the payoﬀ depends
on bids of the opponents, such as the second-price auction, for instance. Also, this allows the study of “exotic” auctions, i.e.,
auctions where the payment is an arbitrary function of all bids.
8More precisely, his payoﬀ would be ui,0 (t,b) +
Pmi
k=1 ui,k (t,b)δi,k where δi,k = 0 if k ≤ ei and δi,k = 1 if k > ei. To
simplify notation we just write, without loss of generality:
Pmi
k=0 ui,k (t,b).
51. If bi,k < si,k then ai,k (b) = 0.
2. If bi,k > si,k then ai,k (b) = 1.






ai,k (b) = K.
The interpretation is the following. If ai,k (b) = 1 then player i wins at least k objects. If ai,k (b) = 0
then player i wins at most k−1 objects. Formally, the ﬁrst condition says that if player i’s k-th bid is lower
than the K −k+1 highest competing bid he will not be awarded the k-th object. The second condition says
that if player i bids higher for unit k than the K − k + 1 highest competing bids then he will win at least k
objects. The third says that if he wins at least k objects then he must also win at least 1,...k − 1 objects.
The fourth says that at most K units are allocated among the N agents.
Observe that in the deﬁnition of allocation rules, there is freedom to deﬁne the rule only when bi,k = si,k,
provided the other conditions are satisﬁed. Thus, it is suﬃcient to deﬁne the rule for ties.
This setting is very general and applies to a broad class of discontinuous games, as we exemplify below.9
Allocation Rules
Example 1 (Nominal Allocation Rule) Let us suppose that the bidders are numbered following a given order
(say, the lexicographic order for their names). We can deﬁne that, in the case of a tie, the bidder with the
least number, among those that are tying, gets the object. It is easy to see that this rule satisﬁes all conditions
in deﬁnition 1.
Another example of allocation rule is the standard one, that splits randomly the objects.
Example 2 (Standard Allocation Rule) In the case of a tie, the objects involved in the tie are randomly
divided among the tying bidders. Formally: if bi,k = si,k then ai,k (b) = p/q where p is the number of the




: such that bj,˜ k > bi,k} and q is the number of








9Obviously, the utility function is speciﬁed only for bidders, that is, for i 6= 0.
6Example 3 (Single unit auctions). ui,1 (t,b) = Ui (vi,1 (t) − bi,1) and ui,0 (t,b) = 0 corresponds to a ﬁrst-
price auction with risk aversion or risk loving.10 If Ui (x) = x, we have risk neutrality. If ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t)
and ui,0 (t,b) = −bi,1 we have the all-pay auction. If ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t) − si,1 and ui,0 (t,b) = 0 we have
the second-price auction. If ui,1 (t,b) = vi (t) − si,2 and ui,0 (t,b) = 0 we have the third-price auction. If
ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t)+bi−si,1 and ui,0 (t,b) = −bi we have the war of attrition. We can have also combinations
of these games. For example, ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t) − αbi − (1 − α)si,1 and ui,0 (t,b) = 0, with α ∈ (0,1), gives
a combination of the ﬁrst- and second-price auctions.
Example 4 (Multi-unit auction with unitary demand). It is also useful to consider K-unit auctions with
unitary demand, among N buyers, 1 < K < N. In this case, bj,k < b0,1, for all j = 1,...,N and k = 2,...,K.
Then, a pay-your-bid auction is given by ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t) − bi,1 and ui,0 (t,b) = 0. If it is a uniform
price with the price determined by the highest looser’s bid, ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t) − si,K and ui,0 (t,b) = 0.
If it is a uniform price with the price determined by the lowest winner’s bid, ui,0 (t,b) = 0, ui (t,b) =
vi,1 (t) − max{bi,1,si,K}.
Example 5 (Multi-unit auctions with multi-unit demand). ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t)−bi,1,..., ui,K (t,b) = vi,K (t)−
bi,K and ui,0 (t,b) = 0 corresponds to a multiple unit auction with discriminatory price. If ui,1 (t,b) =
vi,1 (t) − p(b),..., ui,K (t,b) = vi,K (t) − p(b) and ui,0 (t,b) = 0 it correspond to a uniform multiple unit
auction. There are two diﬀerent uniform price auctions: p(b) can be the lowest winner’s bid (as in some
actual treasury bills auctions) or p(b) can be the highest looser’s bid (as described by Krishna 2002). If
ui,1 (t,b) = vi,1 (t) − si,1,...,ui,k (t,b) = vi,k (t) − si,k, ui,K (t,b) = vi,K (t) − si,K and ui,0 (t,b) = 0 we have
Vickrey auction.
Strategies and Order Statistics
The strategy of a bidder i ∈ N is a bidding function bi : Ti → B. We will use bold type for bidding
functions. Notice that we do not specify a strategy for the non-strategic player, i = 0. We will restrict to
integrable strategies, that is, we assume that the vector of strategies is b = (bi)i∈N ∈
Y
i∈N
L1 (Ti,B). For a
vector of strategies b =(bi)i∈N, let b−i be the vector of strategies of all strategic players except player i, we
denote by si, for a ﬁxed b−i, the function si : T−i → RKN that orders the NK vector (b0,b−i (t−i)) from the
highest to the lowest bid. Notice that we include the non-strategic bid b0. Given b−i and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ KN,
deﬁne the distribution function, Fsi,j (·|ti) on R, by Fsi,j (β|ti) ≡ τ−i ({t−i ∈ T−i : si,j (t−i) < β}|ti)) and let
10If we put ui (t,b) = Ui (vi (t) − bi,1) we can have any attitude towards risk.
7fsi,j (b|ti) be its Radon-Nykodim derivative with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We denote by F⊥
si,j (b|ti)
the singular part of Fsi,j (b|ti).
In the examples, sometimes we will restrict to monotone strategies. In such cases we will implicitly
assume that Ti = R and use the following notation. Given t ∈ T, we deﬁne t(−i) as t(−i) ≡ maxj6=i tj.
Expected Payoﬀ
In order to simplify notation below, we will write (·) in the place of (ti, t−i, b0, bi, b−i (t−i)), (β,·) in the
place of (ti, t−i, b0, (β,bi,−j), b−i (t−i)) and (◦) in the place of (b0, bi, b−i (t−i)). Thus, if the bid b0 and

























Remark 1 There are two important ways in which the third term in the above expression may be omitted.
If for all k = 1,...K, the distribution Fsi,k (−|ti) has no atoms and therefore, the tie-breaking rule (i.e.,
allocation rule a) is not important and, if the auctioneer keeps the objects in case of ties. That is, when
ai,k (◦) = 0 whenever bi,k = si,k.
3 Bidding Behavior
Our ﬁrst result is a characterization of the payoﬀ through its derivative with respect to the bid given by an
integral expression (i.e., a kind of ﬁrst fundamental theorem of calculus). For this, we will need the following
8assumption:
Condition 1 ui,k : T × RK(N+1) → R, k = 0,1,...,K are absolutely continuous on bi,k and ∂bi,kui,k is
essentially bounded.11
Our main result is the following:
Lemma 1 (Payoﬀ Characterization) Assume condition 1. Fix b0 and a proﬁle of bidding functions b−i.


































+E [ui,j (·)|ti,si,j = β]fsi,j (β|ti)
Proof. See appendix.
The most important part of Lemma 1 is the expression of ∂bi,jΠi(ti, b0, (β,bi,−j), b−i). When there is
no tie with positive probability at bi (i.e, Fsi,k (−|ti) has no atoms) ∂bi,jΠi(ti, b0, bi, b−i)is, for almost all
bi,j, the partial derivative of Πi(ti,b0,bi,b−i) (see section 5). It is useful to observe that in the expression of
∂bi,jΠi(ti,b0,(β,bi,−j),b−i) above, the ﬁrst three lines capture only the impact of the changing of bi,j = β in
the payoﬀ (payment) of each unit, while the last line captures the impact of such a change in the probability
11Absolute continuity with respect to bi,k implies that ∂bi,kui,k exists almost everywhere (with respect to Lebesgue measure)
and




Essentially bounded is used to invoke Lebesgue dominated converge theorem.
9of winning the unit j. Note also the diﬀerence in the events in the second and the third line: [bi,k > si,k]
and [β > si,j].
The following corollary characterizes best response bids in an intuitive way.
Corollary 1 (Basic Principle of Bidding) . Under condition 1, the optimum bid is such that the marginal
cost of bidding is equal to the marginal utility from bidding. More formally, if Πi(ti,b0,bi,b−i) is diﬀeren-
tiable at bi ∈ argmax
b∈B
Πi(ti,b0,b,b−i), bi in the interior of B and there is no tie with positive probability at
bi i.e, (Fsi,k (−|ti) has no atoms), then for all j,
















Proof. If Fsi,k (−|ti) has no atoms then F⊥
si,k (−|ti) = 0 almost everywhere. Therefore, by the payoﬀ
characterization lemma:








Observe that E [ui,j (·)|ti,si,k = bi,j]fsi,k (bi,j|ti) represents the marginal beneﬁt of winning unit j, that










represents the marginal cost of participation and the last term represents the
marginal cost of changing j bid for the other inframarginal winning bids. Note that we do not require
separability in the monetary transfer (risk neutrality) to reach such an interpretation.
This interpretation is useful for understanding bidding behavior. In ﬁrst-price auctions, the marginal cost
of bidding is what implies a decreasing bid in the way bidders bid. In second-price auctions, the marginal
cost of bidding is zero, so that each bidder bids until its marginal utility of bidding becomes zero.
The following corrollary will be used later to prove a monotone best-reply result.
10Corollary 2 (Payoﬀ Characterization as a Line Integral) Asume condition 1 and suppose for all i
and k, ∂bi,kΠi exists and is continuous in bi. Fix b0, a proﬁle of bidding functions b−i and a smooth curve
α : [0,1] → B such that α(0) = b0 and α(0) = bi then, for all j = 1....,K the payoﬀ of bidder i when bidding






where ∇biΠi(ti,b0,α(s),b−i) = (∂bi,jΠi(ti,b0,α(s),b−i))j=1,...K
3.1 Examples
The example below show that corollary 1 is a generalization of the necessary ﬁrst-order conditions for the
ﬁrst and second-price auctions presented in Milgrom and Weber (1982), for the war of attrition and all-pay
auctions presented in Krishna and Morgan (1997). The example on double auctions shows that the Basic
Principle of Bidding is concise. Such an example is the application of Corollary 1 for double auctions and it
presents a comparison with the equivalent expression obtained by Williams (1991).
Example 6 (First Price - Single Object Auction). When we restrict ourselves to the case of the ﬁrst-
price single object auction with risk neutrality: K = 1, ui,0 = 0 and ui,1 (t,b0,b) = vi,1 (t) − bi, then
∂biui,1 (t,b0,b) = −1. The condition of corollary 1 becomes:




This (necessary) ﬁrst-order condition provides a useful way to determine best-reply bids. Note that this
expression admits non-monotonic bidding functions, contrary to Milgrom and Weber’s model. It also en-
compasses asymmetries in valuations and distribution of types. Assuming aﬃliation and monotonic utilities,
Milgrom and Weber (1982) can restrict themselves to the space of monotone symmetric bidding functions
(i.e., bi = b, for all i ∈ N). Thus,









where, in the last equation (b)
−1 stands for the inverse (generalized) of b. This equation says that con-

















whose solution is shown to be an equilibrium under aﬃliation.
Example 7 (Second Price - Single Object Auction). In the second price single object auction, Milgrom and
Weber’s model is equivalent to K = 1, ui,1 (t,b) = vi (t) − si,1 and ui,0 = 0. Then, ∂biui,1 (t,b) = 0 and the
condition in corollary 1 reduces to Eτ−i[vi − bi|ti,si,1 = bi]fsi,1 (bi|ti) = 0 which can be simpliﬁed to
bi = E[vi,1|ti,si,1 = bi].
Again, with monotonicity and symmetry assumptions, Milgrom and Weber’s expression for the equilibrium





≡ ¯ v (ti,ti).
Example 8 (All Pay - Single Object Auction). Krishna and Morgan (1997) extend the method of Milgrom
and Weber (1982) to the cases of war of attrition and all-pay auctions. In the all-pay auction, their model
is equivalent to ui,1 (t,b) = vi (t) − si,1 and ui,0 (t,b) = −bi. Then, ∂biui,1 (t,b) = 0 and ∂biui,0 (t,b) = −1.
So, the condition in corollary 1 reduces to
E[vi,1|ti,si,1 = bi]fs−i,1 (bi|ti) = 1.








whose solution they show to be an equilibrium under aﬃliation.
Example 9 (War of Attrition - Single Object Auction). In the war of attrition, Krishna and Morgan
(1997) model is equivalent to ui,1 (t,b) = vi (t) + bi − si,1 and ui,0 (t,b) = −bi. Then, ∂biui,1 (t,b) = 1 and
∂biui,0 (t,b) = −1. So, the condition in corollary 1 reduces to
E[vi,1|ti,si,1 = bi]fsi,1 (bi|ti) = 1 − Fsi,1 (bi|ti).






i 1 − Ft(−i) (ti|ti)
ft(−i) (ti|ti)
,
and the equilibrium is shown to exist under aﬃliation.
Example 10 (Double Auction). In the analysis of a double auction with private values, risk neutrality,
independent types and symmetry among buyers and sellers, Williams (1991) assumes that the payment is
determined by the buyer’s bid. So, it is optimum for the seller to bid her value. To analyze the behavior of
























where b denotes here the symmetric bidding function followed by all buyers, f1 is the common density function
of sellers, f2 is the common density function of buyers, n is the number of sellers, m is the number of buyers





















j F2 (v)i (1 − F1 (β))
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·(1 − F1 (β))






















j F2 (v)i (1 − F1 (β))
n−j ·
·(1 − F2 (v))
m−2−i .
The expression (5) is just a special case of (2). To see this, observe that Fb(−i) (β), the probability that the
12To obtain Kn,m (·,·) just substitute n − 1 for n where it occurs in Mn,m (·,·). To obtain Ln,m (·,·), substitute m − 2 for
m − 1 where it occurs in Mn,m (·,·).
13threshold bid is less or equal to β, is given by the probability of the union of following disjoint events: there
are i bids of buyers and j bids of sellers below or equal to β and i+j = m (because the m-th bid determines





































above. Now, it is a matter of length but elementary derivation to conﬁrm
that















which concludes the proof of the claim.
Example 11 (Multiple Object Discriminatory Auction). Let ui,0 = 0, ui,k(t,b) = vi,k (t) − bi,k. Then
∂bi,jui,k(t,b) = 0 if j 6= k and −1 if j = k. It is easy to show that the condition in corollary 1 reduces to:









Eτ−i[vi,k (t)|ti,si,k = bi,k] − bk (ti)
 ft(−i) (bi,k|ti)
Ft(−i) (bi,k|ti)
Example 12 (Multiple Object Vickrey Auction). Let ui,0 = 0, ui,k(t,b) = vi,k (t)−si,k. Then ∂bi,jui,k(t,b) =
0. Therefore the condition in corollary 1 reduces to:
bi,k = E[vi,k (t)|ti,si,k = bi,k].
This makes clear that the Vickrey Auction implies revelation of the truth in a general setting.
Example 13 (Uniform price auction) Let ui,0 = 0, ui,k(t,b) = vi,k (t) − p, where p is the payment, which
is equal for all units and bidders. There are two common rules for the uniform price auction. One is the
highest looser bid, which is the uniform price auction described by Krishna (2002). In this case, the payment
is equal to the highest bid among those bids that do not receive the object. A variant is to put the payment
14equal to the lowest winning bid. We treat both below. Note that for any k,




−1, if bi,j determines the payment
0, otherwise
In the case of the lowest winning bid, bi,j determines the payment if bi,j > si,j, bi,j+1 < si,j+1 and bi,j <
si,j+1. This event contains the event [bi,k > si,k] if and only if k ≤ j. Thus, the ﬁrst order condition becomes:
bi,j = E [vi,j (t)|ti,si,j = bi,j] − j
Pr[si,j+1 > bi,j > si,j,bi,j+1 < si,j+1]
fs,j (bi,j|ti)
.
In the case of the highest loosing bid, bi,j determines the payment if bi,j < si,j, bi,j−1 > si,j−1 and bi,j >
si,j−1. Similarly,
bi,j = E [vi,j (t)|ti,si,j = bi,j] − (j − 1)




Here we point out some potential applications and how our main result can be used to give a simple prove
of some useful facts about auctions. Some of these results are new.
For all results below, we assume that the strategies b−i of bidder i’s opponents are such that the distri-
bution of si is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Thus, the payoﬀ is given only
by the integral of its derivative.
4.1 Suﬃcient Conditions for Truth-telling
It is widely know that second price auctions lead to bidding equal to the truthful expected value by the
bidder. This can be easily seen from the ﬁrst order condition for this auction:
bi = E[vi,1|ti,si,1 = bi].
The other terms in the ﬁrst order condition disappear because they are identically zero: ∂bi,1ui,1 (t,b) =
0. The reason for that is that the payment does not depend on the own bidder’s bid. It turns out that this
last property is exactly what is need to obtain truthful bidding, as we illustrate below.
Proposition 1 Consider an auction where the bid bi,j never modiﬁes the payment of any unit, more pre-
15cisely, ∂bi,jui,k (t,b) = 0 for all k and (t,b). Then, it is optimal for bidder i to bid bi,j such that:
E [ui,j (·)|ti,si,j = bi,j] = 0.
If the bidder is risk neutral in the unit j, that is, ui,j (t,b) = vi,j (t) − pi,j (b), and the payment p(b) is bi,j
in case of a relevant tie at bi,j = si,k, then the optimal bid is to bid the expected value of the unit:
bi,j = E [vi,j (t)|ti,si,j = bi,j].
Proof. It is suﬃcient to examine the expression of ∂bi,jΠi(ti,b0,(β,bi,−j),b−i) and to observe that in the
event si,j = bi,j, the payment p(b) = bi,j.
Some known results are immediate corollaries:
Corollary 3 The ﬁrst (highest) bid in the uniform price auction (with payment equal to the highest looser
bid) is truthful.
Proof. The ﬁrst bid cannot aﬀect the payment of a winning bidder.
Corollary 4 The bids in the Vickrey auction are truthful.
Proof. In the Vickrey auction, the payments depend only on the others’ bids.





be the ex-ante payoﬀ. We deﬁne the interim and the ex-ante best-reply correspondence, respectively, by




Γi (b−i) ≡ arg max
bi∈L1([0,1],B)
Vi (bi,b−i).
We need the following:
16Deﬁnition 2 Given a partial order < on Ti, we say that a function g (t,b) is strictly increasing (non-































Proposition 2 Assume we are under the conditions of Corrollary 2. Let < be a partial order on Ti. For
all k,j = 1,...,K, assume that ui,k (t,b) is absolutely continuous in t and b, and strictly increasing in ti; and
∂bi,jui,k (t,b) is non-decreasing in ti (except, possibly in a set of null measure). Then the following holds:
1. For each ti, Θi (ti,b−i) is non-empty.

















and assume that these bids imply diﬀerent probability of winning, i.e.,
Pr
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The unidimensional version of the above theorem was used by Araujo and de Castro (2007) to prove
equilibrium existence in single unit auctions. The main role of this result in their equilibrium proof is to
restrict the set of strategies to a compact set (the set of non-decreasing functions). Restricted to this strategy
set, they obtained approximated equilibria of perturbed games, used compactness to obtain a converging
subsequence and proved that the limit is equilibrium of the original auction. Maybe the above theorem could
be equally useful in obtaining new equilibrium existence results for multiunit auctions, but such results are
out of the scope of this paper.
4.3 Identiﬁcation of Multi-Unit Auctions
There is large literature on structural identiﬁcation of unitary auctions (see Athey and Haile (2002), (2005)).
The case of multiple unit demand auctions has been recently the focus of attention. The problem is of
13Given the partial order <, we write x  y if x < y but ∼ (y < x).
17interest in the applied literature because many important markets rely on auction mechanisms to allocate
goods or services and these are naturally modeled as markets for the allocation of multiple units. Prominent
examples are the markets for treasury auctions and for the demand and supply of electricity (see Hortacsu
(2002) for treasury auctions, Hortacsu and Puller (2007) and Wolak (2006) for electricity markets). With
very few exceptions (for example McAdams (2007) or Wolak (2006)), most applied work rely on Wilson
(1979) share model. One of salient features of this approach is the use of continuous bid functions that
are hardly found in real markets. Therefore, it is of interest to study identiﬁcation when bids are discrete.
The particular institutional settings in which some of these auctions are carried in real markets make the
continuos bid assumption unattainable. For example, in England spot electricity market generators make
three bids out of their supply function. In the Colombian spot markets, generators make price oﬀers for
generating a ﬁxed (although diﬀerent among plants) amount of energy per generating unit (see de Castro,
Espinosa and Riascos (2007) for an application of our identiﬁcation results to the Colombian electricity
spot market). Below we provide identiﬁcation results for the two most important multi-unit auctions, the
discriminatory auction and the uniform auction. To the extend of our knowledge, the discrete case result for
the uniform auction is new (Hortacsu and Puller (2007) report a similar result for continuous bid functions).
In all cases, estimation methods assume that observables are generated by a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Recall example 13 where we derived the ﬁrst order conditions for the multi-unit uniform auction. Consider
the case in which agents pay the lowest winning bid.
Proposition 3 Consider the uniform price auction (see example 13). Then if values are private, the
marginal utility of an additional unit is nonparametrically identiﬁed from agents bid. Formally,
vi,j (ti) = bi,j + j
Pr[si,j+1 > bi,j > si,j,bi,j+1 < si,j+1]
fs,j (bi,j|ti)
. (6)
Proof. To the extend that all agents’ bids are observable and one is able to estimate the second term from
the right hand side, identiﬁcation follows.
Remark 2 Equation 6 is analogous to equation (2) in Hortacsu and Puller (2007).
Remark 3 To estimate the right hand side of equation 6 one can follow the same estimation methods of
Hortacsu (2002).
Proposition 4 Consider the discriminatory multi-unit auction (see example 11). Then if values are private,
18the marginal utility of additional unit is nonparametrically identiﬁed from agents bid. Formally,




Proof. The same argument as before.
Remark 4 Equation 7 is analogous to equation (2) in Hortacsu (2002). Notice that Hortacsu (2002) also
studies a discrete version in which prices are restricted to lie in on a discrete grid but the divisibility assump-
tion of goods is still assumed.
Remark 5 To estimate the right hand side of equation 7 one can follow the same estimation methods of
Hortacsu (2002).
5 Appendix: Proofs
5.1 Payoﬀ Characterization Lemma
The proof follows the demonstration of the Leibiniz rule. The main point is the use of a well known theorem
on the derivatives of measures and its integral expression. The theorem we use is in Rudin (1966).















Fix j, and consider each term above separately.














2. If the distribution Fsi,k (−|ti) has no atoms, the third term is equal to zero and its derivative exists
and it’s zero.
193. Now consider the second term,
R
T−i
ui,k (·)1[bi,k>si,k]τ−i(dt−i|ti). There are two cases, j 6= k and j = k.
In the ﬁrst case (j 6= k), let an → (bi,j)











(ui,k (ti,t−i,b0,(an,bi,−j),b−i (t−i)) − ui,k (·))1[bi,k>si,k]τ−i(dt−i|ti)
Since ui has bounded derivative with respect to almost all bi,j,
lim
an→(bi,j)+
ui,k (ti,t−i,b0,(an,bi,−j),b−i (t−i)) − ui,k (·)
an − bi,j
= ∂bi,jui,k (·),





ui,k (ti,t−i,b0,(an,bi,−j),b−i (t−i)) − ui,k (·)
an − bi,j
1[bi,k>si,k]τ−i(dt−i|ti)
















20In the second case (j = k), let an → (bi,k)

























Since ui has bounded derivative with respect to almost all bi,k,
lim
an→(bi,k)+
ui,k (ti,t−i,b0,(an,bi,−k),b−i (t−i)) − ui,k (·)
an − bi,k
= ∂bi,kui,k (·),
for almost all bi,k. Also, 1[an>si,k] → 1[bi,k>si,k]. These imply that:
lim
an→(bi,k)+




for almost all bi,k and these functions are (almost everywhere) bounded. By Lebesgue Theorem, the





(ui,k (ti,t−i,b0,(an,bi,−k),b−i (t−i)) − ui,k (·))
an − bi,k
1[an>ci,k]τ−i(dt−i|ti)
















































where m is Lebesgue measure over R. By Theorem 8.6 of Rudin [1966] this limit exists m-almost









(ti,b0,bi,b−i)dm + ρ⊥ (V ;ti,b0,bi,b−i).






by the same theorem.
It is easy to see that ρ is absolutely continuous with respect to the distribution Fsi,k (·|ti). The Radon-
Nikodym Theorem guarantees the existence of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ρ with respect to the





















































Eτ−i,ti [ui,k (·)|si,k = β]fsi,k (β|ti)dβ
therefore, by the unicity of the Radom Nikodyn derivative of ρ with respect to Lebessgue measure m,
we have that:
g(β) = Eτ−i,ti [ui,k (·)|si,k = β]fsi,k (β|ti),

















E [ui,j (·)|ti,si,j = β]fsi,k (β|ti)














This concludes the proof.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (i) Since B is compact and Πi (ti,·,b−i) is continuous if Fb−i (·) is absolutely continuous, the
conclusion is immediate.
















+E [ui,j (·)|ti,si,j = β]fsi,j (β|ti).
Since b1
i > b2
i, we can choose a curve α : [0,1] → B, such that α(0) = b2
i, α(1) = b1
i, such that
α0
j (s) ≥ 0, ∀j,s ∈ [0,1] and ∃j such that α0











































for all t−i ∈ [0,1]
n−1, all b ∈ Bn and all k. For ﬁxed bid β ∈ B and j, deﬁne the functions












Then, g1 (t−i) + 2δ < g2 (t−i). By the positivity of conditional expectations,15
E

g2 − g1 − 2δ|si,j = β

> 0.











|ti,si,j = β]. (12)
Then, (11), (12), and the expression of ∂biΠi(ti,β,b−i) given by the characterization Lemma imply that
for almost all β,
∇biΠi(t2
i,α(s),b−i) > ∇biΠi(t1
i,α(s),b−i) + δfs (α(s)), (13)
where fs (α(s)) denotes the vector
 
fsi,1 (α1 (s)),...,fsi,K (αK (s))

. The assumption on the distribution


















































i,b0,α(s),b−i) · α0(s)ds > 0;
15See, for instance, Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 6.1, p. 104.
25and the third comes from α0
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